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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT STATUTES AFTER FURMAN
In June 1972 the Supreme Court declared in the case of Futrman v.
.eorgia1 that the death sentence which had been imposed on some six
lundred men and women convicted of capital offenses had to be re-
luced to a lesser punishment. Rather than resolving the controversy
)ver capital punishment, however, this 5-4 decision only prompted at-
:empts by most state legislatures to salvage some type'of death penalty.
Courts, legislatures, and commentators alike have since concluded
hat the decision in Furman applied to all then-existing capital punish-
nent statutes2 except the few which required a death sentence upon con-
viction for a capital offense. It has been generally assumed that the
2olding of the majority does not extend beyond the kind of statutes
vhich allowed either the judge or the jury discretion to impose capital
unishment. However, while it is true that statutes which permitted
his kind of unchecked discretion were particularly offensive to the jus-
ices of the majority, the concern expressed throughout their opinions
:hat the death penalty was not being uniformly imposed extends to the
.ntire capital punishment process.
In short, each justice concluded that untrammeled discretion allowed,
ind indeed maximized, the probability that the harshest punishment
9vould be imposed selectively on a very few offenders, and thus not be
ipplied uniformly to all those for whom it was a possible penalty. This
selectivity led the justices to declare that the death penalty as it was be-
ng imposed was unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause of the eighth amendment.3 But to eliminate discretion in
Lhe actual sentencing process would leave elements of discretion still
xisting in many other phases of the capital punishment system. These
Facets include the authority of the prosecutor to charge offenders as he
sees fit and to decide whether and how much physical evidence (such as
color pictures of the deceased) he will introduce, the authority of the
1408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972): "iTMhe imposition atd carrying out of the death penalty
in [these cases] constitute[s] cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.", Obviously, this decision actually invalidated only the death sen-
tences for the fhree petitioners then before it. The court quickly extended its ruling, how.
ever, to cover all petitioners in like predicaments. For a survey of this process, see Note,
Remains of the Death Penalty-Furnan v. Georgia, 22 DEPAUL L. R V. 481 (1972).
2 The following states had completely abolished the death penality prior to the decision:
Alaska (1957), Hawaii (1957), Iowa (1965), Minnesota (1911), Oregon (1964), West Vir-
ginia (1965), and Wisconsin (1853).
3 U.S. GONsT. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962), explicitly held that the eighth amendment applied to the states through
the fourteenth.
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jury to convict for a lesser degree of homicide, the widely varying com-
petence of defense counsel, and the constitutional prerogative of the gov-
ernor to commute death sentences to life imprisonment, The uneven ex-
ercise of discretion, which is the crux of the majority opinions in Fttrman,
remains in all of these aspects. Thus any analy;is of these opinions which
relies solely upon the sentencing discretion avoids the essence of the deci.
sion.
This note will examine the capital punishment process by illustrating
how the discretionary aspects enumerated above functioned prior to the
Furman decision. It will show that Furman requires either the abolition
of these discretionary facets or, if that proves impossible, the abolition of
capital punishment itself. Finally, it will analyze the nineteen statutes
passed in the intervening two years to determine whether they follow
the Supreme Court's mandate. It will attempt to demonstrate that the
legislatures have done no more than simply shore up their capital punish-
ment sch6mes by curtailing judge and jury discretion. Since the discre-
tion within other phases has not been eliminated, the Supreme Court's
requirement of uniformity in the imposition of the death penalty has not
been satisfied.
I. TRADITIONAL DISCRETIONARY ASPECTS IN
THE IMPOSITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
In contrast to the English practice which, up to the nineteenth cen-
tury, prescribed the death penalty for nearly 250 crimes, the number of
capital offenses in the United States has never exceeded forty.4 There.
fore, while much of the early reform movement in England concentrated
on reducing the number of capital crimes, this kind of limitation was ac-
complished with little effort in America. 5 Instead, four major reforms in
America were undertaken to revise both the method of sentencing and
the modes of execution. These included introducing electrocution and
gas for the execution (replacing hanging or shooting), substituting pri-
vate for public executions, revamping the murder statutes into degrees of
murder in order to make only first degree murder a capital offense, and
allowing the jury (or judge) to decide whether or not to impose the
death penalty.0 All of these were originally instituted in the hope of re-
4 The most common capital offenses were murder, treason, kidnapping, rape, carnal
knowledge, robbery, bombing, assault with a deadly weapon by a life term prisoner, train
wrecking, burglary, arson, perjury in a capital case, and espionage. First degree murder,
in turn, was the most common conviction for a capital offense. For a general survey of
the capital punishment system within the United States see 1-. B11DAU, THr DMATH P13NALTY




stricting the use of the death penalty as a preliminary step towards-total
abolition. The latter two reforms, however, became major stumbling
blocks in the movement for abolition, in that their selective use so signif-
icantly reduced the number of executions that the public was able to tol-
erate capital punishment because of its infrequent imposition.7 The fol-
lowing sections will analyze the effects both of the division of murder into
degrees and of the sentencing discretion of judge and jury. In addition,
two other major factors allowing uneven results in the imposition of the
death penalty will be discussed: the governor's power of commutation
and the competency of defense counsel.
A. Degrees of Murder
Since almost all defendants in capital trials in this country are accused
of murder, the discretionary aspects involved in the sentencing and con-
viction processes for this crime constitute a major portion of the entire
capital punishment scheme. England has never formulated the distinc-
tions between first and second degree murder that are now commonplace
in the United States. The first state to initiate this distinction was Penn-
sylvania, which in 1794 enacted the statute which was to become the
model for the other states.8 "Malice," the English criterion for murder,
was subdivided into categories. First degree murder, the capital offense,
was characterized as willful, deliberate or premeditated killing, or as a
killing during the commission of another specified felony. All other
murders were second degree, non-capital offenses. This demarcation
brought two major discretionary aspects into the criminal justice system:
the discretion of the jury to designate the type of murder for which it
found the defendant guilty, and the discretion of the prosecutor in his
deciding how to charge the defendant.
1. Discretion of the jury in choosing the degree of murder In its
verdict
The division of murder into degrees results in an uneven application
of the death penalty for two basic reasons: (1) the difficulty of dis-
71d. See also Goldberg and Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Uncontitullonal,
83 HARV. L. IV. 1773, 1791 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Goldberg).
8 BEDAU, supra note 4, at 24:
tA]ll murder, which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait,
or by any other kinds of wilful, deliberate and pre-meditated killing, or which shall
be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, tape, robbery,
or burglary, shall be deemed murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of mur-
der shall be deemed murder In the second degree; and the jury, before whom any
person indicted for murder shall be tried, shall, if they find such person guilty
thereof, ascertain in their verdict, whether it be murder of the first or second degree
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tinguishing conceptually between first and second degree murder; and
(2) the uncontrolled discretion of the jury in deciding which degree is
appropriate for each defendant.
With respect to the first problem, various authorities have noted the
inherent difficulty in attempting to differentiate between first and second
degree murderers. For instance, when it was proposed to the Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment that England should institute some
type of degree formulation for the crime of murder, the Commission
rejected such a classification, in part because of the impossibility of dis-
criminating between those who might merit the death penalty and those
who might not.'
Furthermore, the Commission found that the obscure definition of
premeditation prevented any consistent or intelligible application of the
concept by anyone, including a jury. 10  Likewise, the drafters of the
Model Penal Code have found these designations of first and second
degree murders to be inappropriate because they are incapable of precise
application:
The reason is that we are thoroughly convinced that neither premedita-
tion and deliberation nor the fact that the homicide occurred in the com-
mission of a felony included in the typical enumeration provide criteria
which include all homicides that arguably should be dealt with by the
highest sanction or exclude all homicides that should not be.'
Thus the imprecision and complexity of the concept of premeditation
made an even-handed usage of that criterion impossible. This factor
was aggravated by the unfettered power of the jury in choosing the de-
gree in its verdict.
Most of the statutes demarcating .degrees of murder had a concommi-
tant provision that the jury was to designate the degree of murder for
which it found the defendant guilty. The Supreme Court in Winston v,
United States 2 explicitly upheld the jury's role in choosing the degree as
a proper exercise of the powers conferred upon it by the legislatures.
The Court emphasized that
the steadfastness with which the full and free exercise by the juries of
powers newly conferred upon them by statute in this matter has been
OROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNIsHMENT, REPoRT 113-174 (Great Britain,
1953). (hereinafter cited as ROYAL COMMISSION).
'Old. at 174-184. A similar problem exists if there is a requirement of "purpose"
as an element of first degree murder. For an example of an obvious misapplication of this
criterion see State v. Salter, 149 Ohio Sr. 264, 78 N.E.2d, 575 (1948), as discussed In
L. Herman, An Acerbic Look at the Death Penalty in Ohio, 15 CASE W. Rus. L. Rnv, 512,
530 (1964).
11 MODBL PENAL CODE § 201.6, Comment (Tent. Draft, No. 10, 1959).
12 172 US. 303 (189P).
[Vol. 35
9741 NOTES
upheld and guarded by this court as against the possible effect of any re-
striction or omission in the rulings and instructions of the judge pre-
siding at the trial.13
It is improbable, however, that this function was performed by the
ary with a full understanding of the law. Whether any jury could com-
,rehend the confusing and varied sets of instructions arising from the
tatute is subject to real doubt.'4  Even when they have understood
hem, it is unknown how often juries have ignored the words of the stat-
ites and allowed extraneous considerations and emotions to enter into
heir determinations of when to mete out the most serious verdict.
There is evidence of a substantial disparity between the offense with
vhich a defendant is charged and the offense for which he is ultimately
onvicted. For instance, in 1972, of the 2,853 persons charged within
he general category of murder and negligent manslaughter, 37.4 percent
vere found guilty of the offense charged, while 20.8 percent were con-
'icted of a lesser offense. 5 The Ohio Legislative Service Commission
oncluded, on the basis of a study on the imposition of the death penalty
ietween the years 1949 and 1958, that (comparing the number of homi-
ides committed to the number of executions) the death penalty was ad-
ainistered in a "highly selective manner."' 0 Based on evidence presented
a hearings, the Royal Commission indicated a similar conclusion. 7 And
t least one commentator has stressed that:
Some juries find second degree despite the facts and the judge's instruc-
tions; other juries, more conscientious than merciful, find first degree
where warranted; still others muddle through the "mystifying psychol-
ogy" to a bewildered finish. In conjunction with the death penalty,
these degrees of murder have created a combination which tends to pro-
duce a most haphazard application of the criminal law in capital cases. 8
"hus the creation of degrees of murder which are indistinguishable in
heory and in practice, in combination with the tendency of juries to
onvict on the basis of emotional reaction rather than on the basis of a
!gislative judgment, has helped to produce an uneven application of the
.eath penalty.
13 Id. at 312.
-
4 B. CARwozo, LAw AND LITERATuRE 99-101 (1931).
15 1972 Uniform Crime Reports 113, (1972).
16 OHIo LEGISLATIVE SERVICE CoMMIssIoN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 50-54 (Staff Re-
.arch Report No. 46, Jan. 1961) (hereinafter cited OwIo LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COM-
rIssIoN). The Commission determined that only "one out of 3.6 persons charged with
rst-degree murder is found guilty of that offense."
17 ROYAL CoMMISsION, supra note 9, at 181-189.
1 8 Ehrmann, The Death Penaalty and the Administration of Justice, in BEDAU, supra note
,at 429.
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2. Prosecutorial discretion
It is manifest that the discretion of the prosecutor to decide not only
whether an offender should be prosecuted, but also what degree of crimi-
nal activity he should be prosecuted for is virtually uncontrolled (and
perhaps uncontrollable). Defendants who have attempted to assert an
abuse of this discretion as a basis for an equal protection or due process
defense have met with little success.1 The practice has been severely
criticized not only because it has led to the prosecution of some defen-
dants on the basis of their notoriety or the prosecutor's desire for political
gain, but also because it has led, in the case of some offenders, to no
prosecution at all. This inconsistent treatment of the total class of of-
fenders is immune to correction, for neither the defendant nor the public
has effective power to question the prosecutor's exercise of discretion.2"
The rationale for prosecutorial discretion is that it is useful in plea
bargaining situations, it prevents a clogging of the court system, and it
allows the consideration of important litigational factors, such as the
most effective use of public resources to obtain the greatest number of
convictions. Suggestions have been made that it is possible and desirable
to develop objective standards to control this discretion.2' Whether or
notsuch discretion can be effectively curtailed, to this point at least there
have been no legal steps taken to do so. Yet the very existence of this
kind of discretion effectively prevents uniformity within the criminal jus-
tice system, despite whatever steps are taken elsewhere to restrict other
types of discretion.
The problems become especially acute in the capital punishment pro-
cess because the prosecutor's charge is the first step towards execution.
If the prosecutor chooses to charge second degree murder, then he has
eliminated at the outset the possibility of that defendant's incurring the
death penalty.22  In any given situation, however, it is open to debate
whether the prosecutor's choice has been based on permissible legal fac-
tors or on impermissible personal value judgments. The evidence on
the actual abuse of this particular facet of the capital punishment pro-
cess is meager. Considering the enormous potential for plea bargaining
1oSee, e.g., Hutcherson v. United States, 345 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Newman
v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
2 0 K. DAvIs, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 190-191 (1969).
21 Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 U,C,L,A.
L. REV. 1 (1971); see also Note, Prosecutorial Discretion-a Re.Evaluatlon of the Prose.
cutor's Unbridled Discretion and its Potential for Abuse, 21 D13PAUL L. REV. 485 (1971).
2 2 See, e.g., Tnx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 1.14 (1966), which specifically allowed
the prosecuting attorney to single out the defendants for which the death penalty would
be sought by requiring the filing of notice of intention within a certain time period.
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a this context (i.e. charges for first degree murdir carry the possibility
,f the death penalty, whereas charges for second degree murder carry
io possibility of the death penalty), it is likely that the effect of this
liscretion has been to force some defendants who should never have
,een charged with first degree murder to plead guilty to escape execution,
.nd to reprieve other defendants whose crimes warrant a first degree
harge by initially charging them with second degree murder.
The Royal Commission found that "the legal definition of first degree
s far from satisfactory and in practice it is often ignored by prosecuting
.uthorities, with the acquiescence of Judges, and by juries."23 Other
actors, such as possible race or class discrimination are difficult to es-
ablish because of the tremendous bulk of records (as well as their in-
.dequacy) that would have to be perused. Nevertheless, since such dis-
rimination is evident at the top of the pyramid (number actually exe-
uted out of the total possible) ,24 there is no reason for supposing that
uch abuse does not occur at the base as well. Although the instances of
his kind of abuse of discretion are inestimable, it cannot fairly be con-
ested that it has been a source of the uneven imposition of the death
,enalty.25
Thus the division of murder into degrees, joined with the power of
he prosecutor and then the jury to choose the degree for which a de-
endant will be punished, has been a significant cause of the arbitrary in-
iction of the death penalty.
3. Competency of Defense Counsel
It is self-evident that the more effective and competent one's counsel,
he greater one's chance of either obtaining an acquittal or minimizing
)unishment. The effectiveness of counsel may in fact be a major deter-
ainant in the outcome of a case. Since the trial judge and the appellate
ourts rarely oversee the capabilities of counsel, the judicial system pro-
,ides little opportunity to rectify inequitable results arising from this
ource unless the incompetence is apparent from the record.26 While
his facet of the capital punishment process is not "discretionary" as the
23 ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 189.
24 See, e.g., Wolfgang, Kelly, and Nolde, Executions and Commutations it Penn ylvania,
a BEDAU, supra note 4, at 474; Bedau, Death Sentences in New Jersey 1907-1960, 19 RUT-
;ERS L. REv. 1 (1964).
25 Goldberg, supra note 7, at 1792-1794.
2 6 See, e.g., People v. McDowell, 69 CaI.2d 737, 447, P.2d 97, 73 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968),
'here the defense counsel's obvious misunderstanding of particular issues was sufficient for
reversal of the conviction. But see Vizcarra-Delgadillo v. United States, 395 F.2d 70
9th Cir. 1968), where allegations based on the investigative phase of a criminal case were
a insufficient claim for a violation of due process.
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term has been used here, it does allow uneven application of the death
penalty.
The evidence for the proposition that the varying competency of
counsel produces inconsistent results is not overwhelming, but significant
correlations have been obtained in some studies. One such study involved
a comparison of case dispositions for defendants who have privately re-
tained counsel and those who have court-appointed counsel .2  For ex-
ample, the Ohio Legislative Services Commission found that 44.4 percent
of those with private counsel received commutations from the governor
while only 30.6 percent of those with public counsel received commuta-
tions.28
This factor may not be as crucial in yielding an arbitrary application
of the death penalty as other factors such as prosecutorial discretion.
Nevertheless, any characteristic of the capital punishment process which
allows a non-uniform application of that penalty is inconsistent with
the constitutional requirement of non-arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty.
C. Judge and/or jury Sentencing
It has been noted that the most obvious form of discretion-that is,
the one that allows the greatest leeway in the application of the death
penalty-is the statutory provision (common to nearly all states prior to
Furman) which allows either the jury or the judge to designate the pen-
alty.29 In part, this provision was originally intended by the legislatures
to allow judges and juries to extend mercy to certain defendants de-
spite the fact that their crimes technically required conviction and impo-
sition of the death sentence.
2 7 It should be emphasized that the presumption here is not that court-appointed counsel
are inherently less qualified than retained counsel. Rather, the demands on their time and
resources are such that they cannot be as well prepared nor as able to follow each case
and therefore be as effective as retained counsel.
2 8 OHIo LEGISLATIVE SERVICES COMMISSION, supra note 17, at 63.64. See aio Wolf-
gang, et al., supra note 24, at 482-84. The latter study noted a similar statistical difference;
however, it was also significantly related to the race factor--leaving the actual effect of having
court-appointed counsel undetermined.
29 California.and Georgia had typical statutes allowing jury discretion. CAL. PENAL CODn
§ 190 (West 1970): "Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death,
or confinement in the state prison for life, at the discretion of the court or jury trying
the same...." GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1302 (1968): "The crime of rape shall be punished
with death, unless the defendant is recommended to mercy by the jury, in which case the
punishment shall be for not less than one nor more than twenty years." All states which





Since its inception in the early nineteenth century, discretionary sen-
tencing by the jury has been incorporated within the capital punishment
systems of most states. Discretionary sentencing has been fostered by
the inability of legislatures to define the crimes, or offenders that deserved
the death penalty, as well as by a lingering fear that juries might other-
wise acquit defendants for whom they find death inappropriate (jury
nullification).
Thus after the Supreme Court explicitly upheld the jury's right to ex-
ercise this kind of discretionary function in Winston v. United States,30
it continued to sustain such a right, without intensive examination of
its potential for abuse, through 1968: "The Congress can of course miti-
gate the severity of capital punishment. The goal of limiting the death
penalty to cases in which the jury recommends it is an entirely legitimate
one.'"'" Because it is nearly impossible, in most cases, to determine the
actual foundation for a jury's decision,32 this principle of unfettered dis-
cretion provided for little remedial correction of abuses. Clearly, how-
ever, this authority allowed juries to designate the death penalty when-
ever they wished. In practice, it functioned as a means of radically re-
ducing the number of people ultimately executed to a small minority-
especially in the twentieth century.33 In a study of the practice in North
Carolina during the years 1938-1953, it was shown that only 21.8 percent
of those convicted of first degree murder were committed by jury deci-
sion to death row. 4 Whether or not this authority was used in a discrim-
inatory fashion among identifiable classes, it is evident that it allowed
highly disparate sentences to be given to different individuals.
2. Judicial discretion
In several states, the legislatures decided that the ultimate decision on
capital punishment should rest with the judge. Statutes in such states
generally allowed the jury to recommend a sentence which the judge
could either accept or reject, as he saw fit.35 The Supreme Court up-
30 172 U.S. 303, 310 (1899); see also Calton v. Utah, 130 U.S. 83 (1889).
3 1 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968).
3 2 People v. Hines, 61 Cal. 2d, 164, 169, 390 P.2d 398, 402, 37 Cal. Rptr. 622, 626
(1964).
3 3 In 1935, there were 199 executions in the United States. In 1965, even before
the moratorium got underway, there were seven.
S4Johnson, Executions and Commutations in North Carolina, in BEDAU, supra note 4,
at 453. Further, 13.6 percent of the convicted rapists, six percent of the first degree burglars
and one percent of the arsonists were sentenced to die.
35 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAWS § 1045 (McKinney 1909) (as quoted in Williams v.
19741
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held such a procedure in Williams v. New York 0 as a proper method
of ensuring the individualization of punishment in accordance with the
judge's traditional role as the sentencing agent. As for the possibilities
of abuse, the Court remarked: "But in considering whether a rigid con-
stitutional barrier should be created, it must be remembered that there is
a possibility of abuse wherever a judge must choose between life impris-
onment and death."37
It was the presumption of such statutes that the judge was able to ex-
ert a rational influence on the choice of penalty, based on his experience
and legal training. It has been demonstrated in other areas of sentenc-
ing, however, that there has traditionally been a notable lack of uniform-
ity of sentencing procedures among trial judges. 8 It has been surmised
that this wide variance is not due to a difference in cases or offenders but
rather is a result of differences in the backgrounds of the judges.80 In
other words, judges often sentence on the basis of their personal value
judgments regarding the seriousness of the crime or the moral iniquity of
the defendant, and not on any objective standard based either on legisla-
tive judgments or on the welfare of society. Since these value judg-
ments lead to inconsistent sentences among similar defendants, it is evi-
dent that judges as well as juries abuse the discretionary power to
sentence. 40
D. Governor's Power to Commute
Executive clemency is virtually an unrestricted power. Generally, the
power is conferred by state constitutions, thu; preventing the legislatures
from encroaching on the governor's authority.4 ' Even in states which
New York, 337 U.S. 241, 242 (1948): "Murder in the first degree is punishable by death,
unless the jury recommends life imprisonment. . ." § 1045-a: "Upon such recommendation,
the court may sentence the defendant to imprisonment for the term of his natural life."
36 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
37Id. at 251.
38 For a statistical evaluation of the irrational imposition of other penalties, see Glueck,
Predictive Devices and the Individualization of Justice, 23 LAW & CONTMP. PROD, 461,
465 (1958).
39 Id. See also Gaudet, Harris and St. John, individual Differences in the Seniendng
Tendencies of Judges, 23 J. CRIM. L. C. & P. S. 811 (1933); Nagel, Judicial Backgrotindi
and Criminal Cases, 53 J. CRIM. L. C. & P.S. 333 (1962).
40 As to the concurrence of judges and juries, see Kalven and Zeisel, The American
Jury and the Death Penalty, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 769 (1966). The authors emphasized
that despite the fact that the judge and jury agreed on the penalty in 81 percent of the
cases studied, the factors that led to divergent decisions were highly disparate.
41 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art 5, § 8: "Subject to application procedures provided by
statute, the Governor, on conditions he deems proper, may grant a reprieve, pardon and
commutation, after sentence, except in case of impeachment." See also Note, Executive
Clemency, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 136, 143 (1964).
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have designated that a Board of Pardons have this authority (either
alone or in conjunction with the governor), its use remains entirely dis-
cretionary. The few restrictions that have been placed on the commut-
ing power have not included objective standards for determining when
it should be exercised; the governor or the board can consider any type
of criteria in making the clemency decision.42 Most states provide for
some type of investigation and hearing process; however, these provi-
sions are not comparable to the strict procedural due process standards
which have been established for criminal trials. For instance, defendants
are rarely permitted to attend their own hearings. There are no set pro-
cedures for conducting these hearings, and only such evidence is re-
ceived as is determined appropriate by the presiding official-either the
governor or the Chairman of the Board of Pardons.
. Moreover, the reasons for granting or denying clemency in any given
case are either kept within the confines of the governor's office or pub-
licized only through a recital of generalities4 s Thus the possibilities,
and indeed probabilities, for arbitrary use of the clemency authority are
conspicuous. Nevertheless, it would be as difficult for a convicted de-
fendant to show actual abuse in this area as it would be to fashion a rem-
edy, since there is no higher authority to petition.
Various studies have challenged the traditional assumption that the
clemency prerogative is used rationally. One such study concluded that
"consistency, certainty and principles are lacking. ''44  This is not to say
that valid factors, such as the disparity of sentences for felony murder
and the nature of the crime,45 have not been applied as well. The fact
remains, however, that the clemency power is subject to abuse and to ca-
pricious application both from changes in administration and from a lack
of promulgated standards.40 Thus the clemency authority is an impor-
tant factor in the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. Moreover,
since this power arises from state constitutions, legislative enactments on
the death penalty will have no effect on the use of this authority.
All of these discretionary aspects of the capital punishment process
form the context in which Furman was decided. All were presumed to
be necessary as methods to achieve individualization and extend mercy
42 Id. at 143-46.
43Id. at 158.
4 4 Johnson, Executions and Commutations in North Carolina, in BEDAU, supra note 4,
at 463. There were significant correlations between commutation and the race and occupa-
tional status of offenders. Moreover, of the men executed, 49.6 percent had no previous prison
record; and only 15.9 percent of those executed had a significant prior criminal history.
4 51Note, Executive Clemency, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 136, 159-76 (1964).
46 Goldberg, supra note 7, at 1792.
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in the actual implementation of the statutes. In practice, however,
the system had two main results: (1) since the major responsibility for
applying the statutes was placed on jurors, judges, prosecutors, and gov-
ernors, the legislatures had little incentive to undertake any review of
the system of capital punishment; and (2) since so many areas of sub-
stantial discretion were allowed to coexist, capricious and arbitrary selec-
tions became unavoidable.
1I. FURMAN AND ARBITRARINESS
The argument that convinced a majority of the Supreme Court that
the death penalty was unconstitutional was, simply stated, that the ca-
pricious use of the death penalty made it cruel and unusual. Various
components of this argument have been in the literature on capital pun-
ishment for years; at its core lies the concept of due process:
And due process is so secured by laws operating on all alike, and not
subjecting the individual to the arbitrary exercise of the powers of gov-
ernment, unrestrained by the established principles of private right and
distributive justice .... The power of the State must be exerted within
the limits of those principles, and its exertion cannot be sustained when
special, partial and arbitrary.47
Since the arbitrary exercise of governmental power is constitutionally
impermissible, the question then becomes: What constitutes an arbitrary
exercise of power? In assessing individual punishments, the question
is particularly difficult. Although In re Kemmler48 indicated that uni-
formity among penalties was an essential part of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment,40 Howard v. Fleming0 effectively abro-
gated such a goal by holding that "[u]ndue leniency in one case does
not transform a reasonable punishment in another case to a cruel one." 1
In this way, the criterion of uniformity under the cruel and unusual clause
was laid to rest for seventy years until sufficient factual data could be
mustered to show that the custom of imposing capital punishment had
become completely unreasoning.
The effect of this irregular imposition had been noted fleetingly by
writers in their general discussions concerning the death penalty. While
4 7 Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U.S. 692, 697-98 (1890).
48 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
40 [A]nd in the administration of criminal justice, [the Amendment] requires that
no different or higher punishment shall be imposed upon one than is imposed
upon all for like offences.
Id. at 449.
50 191 U.S. 126 (1903).
51 Id. at 136.
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explaining the power of the Home Secretary to commute the death sen-
Lence-which was exercised in approximately 50 percent of the cases-
I. L. A. Hart commented that "indeed the death penalty would not have
been tolerated at all had it been carried out in all cases where it was
imposed. ' -52  In 1972, the concept of 'arbitrariness finally emerged as a
:onstitutional criterion in People v. Anderson,53 in which the California
3upreme Court struck down the death penalty on almost every conceivable
Dasis-including the infrequency of executions as an indication of pub-
[ic rejection of that penalty.54 The argument, that the public acceptance
:f this penalty is measured by how society acts and not simply by what
the law says on its face, was a mainstay in Anthony Amsterdam's brief in
Aikens v. California.5"
In turn, Amsterdam's brief, written for one of the four petitioners
riginally before the court, became the primary stimulus for the decision
[i Furman. Although the argument had existed in fragmentary form,
Amsterdam formed a coherent theory under the cruel and unusual pun-
Ishment clause of the eighth amendment. Basing his theory on a wealth
)f factual information," Amsterdam demonstrated that the death penal-
:y had been progressively rejected by the public-covertly, if not overtly.
Ihe conclusion that followed was simply that the capital punishment stat-
ates were tolerated by the public only so long as they were rarely applied
in practice. "The distinction which we draw here lies between what pub-
lic conscience will allow the law to say and what it will allow the law to
io-between what public decency will permit a penal statute to threaten
and what it will allow the law to carry out.... ."17
Drawing from English historical precedents,58 Amsterdam ascer-
tained that the very purpose of the eighth amendment was to prevent
society from inflicting penalties on unpopular and weak minorities
when that society's standards of decency would not permit the same pen-
alties to be imposed "uniformly, regularly, and even-handedly":' 9 on the
entire population of defendants convicted for the same crimes. Thus,
"
2 Hart, Murder and the Principles of Punishment: England and the United States, 52
Nw. U.L. REv. 433, 438 (1957); see also Goldberg, supra note 7, at 1789.
536 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
54 6 Cal. 3d at 649, 493 P.2d at 894, 100 Cal. Rprr. at 166.
55406 U.S. 813 (1972). Aikens was dismissed by the Supreme Court due to the inter-
vening decision by the Supreme Court of California invalidating that state's statute under the
state constitution.
56 Brief for Petitioner in Aikens v. California, at 26-39.
57 Id. at 20.
58 Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57
ZAJiF. L REv. 839 (1969).
5 9 Brief for Petitioner at 24.
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he argued, the capricious application of the death penalty violated the
cruel and unusual clause of the eighth amendment and the defendants'
death sentences had to be overturned.("
As a prelude to an analysis of the individual majority opinions in
Furman, it should be emphasizedthat the challenge to the death penalty
in that case did not depend on the arbitrariness resulting from discre-
tionary sentencing alone. In fact, the arguments and briefs before the
court indicated that the attack was directed toward the entire criminal
justice system, which is permeated with discretionary functions. A brief
synopsis of the opinions of the majority will show that although some
of the language stressed the discretionary sentencing problems, the main
thrust was against all discretionary aspects within the system.
Though Mr. Justice Douglas relied substantially on the discrimination
of the system against the blacks, he also noted the discrepancy between
the laws as written and as applied. As a preface to the main portion of
his opinion, he established that "what may be said of the validity of a
law on the books and what may be done with the law in its application
do, or may, lead to quite different conclusions." 0' 1 Using the historical
argument (i.e., that the clause was intended in part to prevent irregu-
lar imposition of punishments) and the evidence introduced by the
petitioners, he found that it was cruel and unusual "to apply the death
penalty . . . selectively to minorities whose numbers are few, who are out-
casts of society, and who are unpopular, but whom society is willing
to see suffer though it would not countenance general application of the
same penalty across the board." ' 2 'Despite Mr. Justice Douglas's concern
with the sentencing of defendants by whim or prejudice,03 the policies he
enunciated extend over the entire system. For instance, he indicated
that a mandatory penalty would not be the answer, because it could still
be selectively imposed on minorities and lower classes through the opera-
tion of all the discretion which the system allows.0' Coupled with this
concern was his determination that the legislatures must write penal
laws (presumably all laws within the penal code) that are "even handed,
6 0 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), may have both "unusual" and
"cruel" in its determination. It seems, however, that the latter word was the basis for
the decision in that the punishment there seemed inherently cruel to the sensibilities of
the justices. Although an often-suggested test of disproportionality (i.e. the punishments
for crime X are much greater than the punishments for other similar crimes) may rest In
part on the concept of unusualness, few courts have sustained a challenge under the eighth
amendment on this basis.
01408 U.S. at 242.
02 Id. at 245.
0a Douglas mentioned as well the problems associated with the differences among the
abilities of attorneys and their relationship to the system as a whole. Id, at 256.
G4 Id. at 257.
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nonselective and nonarbitrary."0 5  In order to have capital punishment
laws that fulfill Mr. Justice Douglas's criteria, every discretionary facet of
the system would have to be eliminated,
Mr. Justice Brennan formulated a four-part test under the cruel and
unusual clause: (1) a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrad-
ing to the dignity of human beings; (2) the State must not arbitrarily
inflict a severe punishment; (3) a severe punishment must not be unac-
ceptable to contemporary society; (4) a severe punishment must not be
excessive. 6 Although all four tests had to be met for him to declare
the death penalty unconstitutional, it is sufficient for this analysis that
only two of them be considered: arbitrary infliction of the punishment
and society's rejection of the death sentence. 7
Mr. Justice Brennan maintained that the clause was directed, at least
in part, against the arbitrary imposition of penalties for criminal conduct:
There is scant danger, given the political processes "in an enlightened
democracy such as ours" thaf extremely severe punishments will be wide-
ly applied. The more significant function of the clause, therefore, is to
protect against the danger of their arbitrary infliction.68
On the basis of the decreasing .incidence of executions in the twentieth
century, he concluded that the infliction of the death penalty was so rare
that it necessarily entailed a haphazard application. In conjunction
with this, he noted several of the practices responsible for the rarity with
which the death penalty was imposed: jury nullification, discretionary
sentencing, executive clemency, and the more rigorous scrutiny exer-
cised by the appellate courts in capital cases. 9
When an unusually severe punishment is authorized for wide.scale appli-
cation but not, because of 'society's refusal, inflicted save in a few in-
stances, the inference is compelling that there is a deep seated reluctance
to inflict it. Indeed, the likelihood is great that the punishment is toler-
ated only because of its disuse.70
Mr. Justice Brennan condemned all practices which allow society to im-
pose the death penalty selectively.
Mr. Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment on the basis that there
was little, if anything, to distinguish between those who were sentenced to
death and those who were not. Although he confined his short analysis
65 Id. at 256.
66 Id. at 271-79.
67 It is highly unlikely that Brennan would reverse his opinion that the death penalty
is degrading to human dignity and that it is unnecessary to achieve appropriate penal goals.
6Sd. at 277.
691d. at 297-99.
70 Id. at 300.
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to those "sentenced" to die, it is not clear that he considered such dis-
cretion to be the only unconstitutional aspect of the system. Apparently,
he would oppose any arbitrary infliction of the death penalty. "I simply
conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate
the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit
this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed." '
Mr. Justice Marshall did not rely on the arbitrariness argument which
underlies the opinions of Justices Douglas, Brennan and Stewart. He
established four separate criteria for use in evaluating punishments un-
der the cruel and unusual clause:
1) [P]unishments that involve so much physical pain and suffering
that civilized people cannot tolerate them ...
2) [P]unishments that are unusual, signifying that they were previous-
ly unknown as penalties for a given offense....
3) [A punishment that is] excessive and serves no valid legislative
purpose ....
4) [A punishment which] public sentiment abhors .... 72
Marshall admitted that the first two criteria are inapposite in a considera-
tion of the constitutionality of the death penalty. Therefore, his analysis
concentrated on the latter two, and led him to the conclusion that capi-
tal punishment was clearly excessive and served no valid penal purpose.
More appropriate to the purposes of this note, Mr. Justice Marshall
was convinced that the penalty was exacted against identifiable classes of
people-primarily on the basis of discrimination. Accordingly, he main-
tained that the public would resoundingly disapprove of this penalty if
it knew that it was being used against the "forlorn."7 8 Although this
conclusion is reached by a different route from that taken by the other
Justices, it is sufficient to show that Mr. Justice Marshall would censure
any capital punishment process which would lead to discriminatory re-
sults.
Finally, Mr. Justice White addressed the infrequency with which the
penalty was imposed to illustrate that its penal purposes were not being
fulfilled. He concluded that the legislature's delegation of sentencing
policy to the ad hoc determinations of the judge and jury was an abdica-
tion by the legislature of its proper role in establishing policy.74 This
delegation had allowed the death penalty to be imposed so infrequently
that the state's interests were being served only marginally-if at all,
'lid. at 310.
71d. at 330-32.




Since the death penalty could be constitutional only if it more than mar-
ginally served a state interest, capital punishment in this system was un-
constitutional. Further, any penal statutes which would either allow
groups other than the legislatures to ascertain penal policies or prevent
the fulfillment of legislatively determined purposes would probably be
found unconstitutional under his thesis also.
In their total effect, the majority opinions manifest a variety of con-
siderations which ultimately converge on the unconstitutionality of the
death penalty. Although it can hardly be said that the opinions track
one another, there is a common concern with the arbitrary infliction of
the death penalty as a violation of the cruel and unusual punishments
clause. As has been demonstrated earlier, the factors which lead to arbi-
trary infliction are the discretionary components of the criminal justice
system in general and the capital punishment process in particular.
III. POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE RE-EXAmINATION
A. Importance of Reform
The effect of the reforms enacted in the nineteenth century within
the capital punishment scheme was to curtail any intensive legislative re-
evaluation of the death penalty (with the exception of the few states
that experimented with abolition). The reforms put the death sentence
out of public view not only by making the executions private but also by
providing many opportunities for groups and individuals to mitigate the
severity of the punishment. As a result, so few actual executions took
place that the public interest in the question of capital punishment be-
came minimal. Feeling no pressure, the law-makers simply did not re-
examine the statutes and the system with any thoroughness. 75 Thus, in
addition to ending the many discretionary elements inherent within the
system of capital punishment, the Furman decision also provided the nec-
essary impetus for legislatures to re-examine the purposes and problems
behind the death penalty. Indeed, some of the dissenters in Furman
welcomed such an opportunity. For instance, Mr. Chief Justice Burger
commented: "I am not altogether displeased that legislative bodies have
been given the opportunity, and indeed unavoidable responsibility to
make a thorough re-evaluation of the entire subject of capital punish-
ment." 76 Mr. Justice Blackmun indicated that this was a subject matter
properly left to the legislatures. Thus he too was in favor of a thorough-
going reform of the capital punishment process.-,
75 Goldberg, supra note 7, at 1790.
76 408 U.S. at 403.
77 Id. at 410.
1974]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Whether the legislators have been actively performing this task since
Furman, however, is highly debatable. It appears that most legislatures,
instead of undertaking thorough reform, are simply attempting to cor-
rect the unconstitutional aspects specifically mentioned in the various
opinions (i.e. judge and jury sentencing) without looking at the entire
scheme. Such an approach ignores the policies enunciated by the majority
justices.
B. Right to Have Rights-A Concept Basic to
Any Capital Punishment Scheme
In any re-evaluation of the policy determinations behind a given set
of laws, it is vital to understand exactly what the ultimate decision means
to those subjected to the laws. Accordingly, it: will be shown here that
capital punishment in essence results in the total denial of a citizen's
right to have rights, and this differs drastically from any other punish-
ment in use today. Since discretion leads to either arbitrary or discrimi-
natory results, a punishment of such magnitude is inherently suspect
when it is imposed by a discretionary system. If a legislature permits
such a punishment to be imposed, it must ensure that there is no discre-
tion in the system.
It has been submitted that capital punishment is different in kind, not
just in degree, from other punishments. 78 Unlike the one who sits in
the electric chair; the life prisoner (as well as all other prisoners) re-
tains certain rights. One of these is the right to have a constitutional de-
cision with a retroactive effect applied to his case, allowing him to glean
whatever benefits he can from it. Whether one terms this a right of
access to the courts or a right to maximize subsequent constitutional judg-
ments in individual cases, the executed have lost' this right completely.
This is of paramount importance when the Supreme Court determines
that a specific attribute of due process substantially affects the reliability
of a conviction, a decision which is given retroactive effect. Only the exe-
cuted have lost the right to apply such a ruling to their convictions, In
fact, "it is dear that there is no reason to suppose that a right to collateral
relief which could arise after a judgment is affirmed on appeal could not
arise after execution of the condemned man-but for the mootness of his
case."
79
In addition to the loss of this attribute of citizenship, the executed
78408 U.S. at 306; see also The Supreme Court 1971 Verm, 86 HARV. L. RIv. 1, 82
(1972).
"
7 9 Note, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CALIF. L. REv. v268, 1361 (1968). See also
Herman, An Acerbic Look at the Death Penalty in Ohio, 15 CAmS W. Ris L. RnV. 512, 531
(1964).
[Vol, 35
loses every other right accorded to him by the Constitution. The Su-
preme Court has zealously safeguarded the basic freedoms, such as free-
dom of speech, for all other citizens. No other punishment, not even
life imprisonment, specifically entails the loss of all constitutional rights.
Yet it has been determined that some convicted defendants, those con-
demned to death, no longer should be allowed to exercise these rights.
Of course, it may be said that the loss of rights is just the necessary con-
comitant to the loss of life and therefore irrelevant. But, on the contrary,
the fact that both are forfeited by the executed illustrates the enormity
of that punishment. And the enormity of a punishment itself is not an
unfamiliar constitutional consideration."
In Trop v. Dulles"' the defendant was punished with denationaliza-
tion for desertion in time of war-a punishment discretionary with the
military authorities and actually imposed on only one-third of all desert-
ers. Although part of the decision dealt with the severe psychological
suffering that accompanied the punishment, the opinion was primarily di-
rected towards the magnitude of the punishment:
There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture.
There is instead the total destruction of the individual's status in orga-
nized society. It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture,
for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was cen-
turies in development .... In short, the expatriate has lost the right to
have hights.82
Mr. Justice Brennan noted in Furman that the magnitude of the death
penalty, which results in the total abrogation of all rights, made that pun-
ishment too "uniquely degrading to human dignity."s However, because
of its "longstanding usage,"84 he believed that this consideration alone
was not sufficient to strike it down. The claim here is not that the con-
fiscation of the right to have rights is inherently unconstitutional, how-
ever appealing that formula may be. Instead, this argument takes issue
with the theory that what may be a permissible method for imposing a
lesser punishment is automatically permissible for capital punishment.
The two systems may correlate to a certain extent. But the very real sub-
stantive difference between the two underscores the fact that anomalies
which are permissible costs in one system may, be prohibited costs in the
other. In other words, arbitrary or capricious choices of punishment can
be rectified, to some extent, for every defendant except the executed one.
so See 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
81356 U.S. 86 (1958).
s2 Id. at 101-02; see also, Goldberg supra note 7, at 1786-87.
83 408 U.S. at 291.
84 Id.
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The very magnitude of the death penalty mandates that no possibility of
erratic application can enter the system. Furthermore, unless the state can
show a great interest in the retention of a system which entails such high
costs to those random victims who are executed, the death penalty should
be replaced by another system of punishment of less magnitude. If states
are unable to structure a system eliminating the possibility of arbitrary ap-
plication, and if the states are also unable to demonstrate a substantial
justification for this penalty, they should abolish capital punishment al-
together.
IV. STATUTES ENACTED SINCE. FURMAN
This section will analyze the various statutes 5 passed since Ffirman,
focusing on the areas in which restrictions on discretion have been for-
mulated and the areas which thus far have been ignored by the legisla-
tures. Generally, statues have concentrated on revamping or eliminating
the discretionary sentencing system. However, despite the various restric-
tions that have been enacted, the legislatures have not achieved a discre-
tion-free system.
The statutes may be classified according to their prime characteristics:
(1) statutes which purport to confer a mandatory death sentence; (2)
statutes which limit the discretion of the judge or jury (or, alternatively,
which narrow the range of crimes for which the death penalty may be
imposed); (3) statutes which have limited the exercise of discretion. In
addition, the elements which have impelled the legislature to seek the
death penalty may be analyzed under four main criteria: (1) harm caused
by the offense; (2) risk of harm caused by the defendant in that offense;
(3) risk of future harm caused by the defendant to society; and (4)
moral fault of the defendant.8"
85 Both the South Dakota legislature and the Massachusetts legislature enacted statutes
which were later vetoed by the governors. As a result, these two states have no death
penalty provisions currently in force. The legislatures of Alabama, Alaska, Maine, Min.
nesota, and West Virginia have not yet enacted a new statute though bills were introduced
(but defeated) to reinstate the death penalty. Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Missouri, New Jersey,
Vermont, and Washington all have bills currently being considered by the legislatures.
Oregon indicates that no substantial move was made to re-enact the penalty. Rhode Island
changed its only statute to provide the death penalty for murders committed by any prisoner,
not just a life prisoner. And South Carolina is following the lead of North Carolina and
Delaware in attempting to sever the discretionary jury sentencing provisions from the statute
to make a mandatory one.
80 This procedure is partially derived from Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punhbmant
Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635, 636 (1966): "Punishment
may be considered in relation to the harm actually resulting from a criminal act, to the
risk of harm caused by the actor, to the degree of temptation he faced, or to his 'moral
fault.'"
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L. Mandatory Death Sentences
To date, nine state legislatures have passed what they consider to be
landatory capital punishment statutes: Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi,
evada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and
Vyoming. These states have attempted to eliminate what was objection-
ble under Furman by moving toward the furthest pole from total dis-
retion. At the same time, all attempts to individualize the punishment
ccording to the offender's characteristics have been forsaken.87  By seek-
ig to ensure the maintenance of the death penalty through blanket coy-
rage such as this, the legislators have made an obvious value judgment
i favor of death.
Some of these statutes contain a general murder clause somewhat simi-
3r to the pre-Furman statutes. For example: "Whoever purposely and
vith premeditated malice, or in the perpetration of, or attempt to per-
)etrate any rape, arson, robbery or burglary... kills any human being
guilty of murder in the first degree.""8  Other statutes simply contain an
atroductory phrase, with no broad definition of first degree murder.
oth types of clauses are followed by a list of six to ten specific factual
ircumstances which would mandate the death penalty. These are pri-
aarily based on the harm caused by the offense and the future risk to
ociety which the defendant represents. There are no separate sentencing
,roceedings to determine these specific circumstances. The most fre-
uently listed circumstances indicating concern with the harm caused are:
(1) A murder of any peace officer, corrections employee, or fire-
man acting in the line of duty;8a
(2) Murder perpetrated in the course of a kidnapping;90
ping;90
(3) A murder committed for profit or reward of any kind by a
defendant after being hired by any person, or the employment or in-
ducement bf another to commit murder;0 '
(4) Intentional murder by the unlawful and malicious use or
detonation of any explosive; 2
8 7 The success of the individualization principle is uncertain at best. At any rate,
has not yet become a constitutional requirement and therefore it can be sacrificed to
te constitutional need for consistency. Cf. Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime,
7 HARV. L. REv. 1071, 1078 (1964).
8 8 WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-54 (1957, as amended by Senate Act No. 50, 1973) [hereinafter
idicated by the dare 1973); see also IND. CODE § 35-13-4-1 (1971) as amended (Supp.
P73); OKLA. STAT. ANN., Tit. 21, § 701.1 (1958) as amended (Supp. 1973).89See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-13-4-1 (1). (1973).
*90 See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-54 (b) (vii) (1973).
91 See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-54 (b)(ii) (1973).
9 2 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. A'N. § 6-54 (b)(iii) (1973).
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(5) Murder in the course of the hijacking of a commercial air-
plane, train, bus, boat, or other commercial vehicle;93
(6) Killing more than one person as the result of a common
plan, scheme, or design. 4
Concern with the risk which the defendant pdses to society are exem-
plified by:
(1) Murder by a person under a sentence of life imprisonment
in the penitentiary;0 5
(2). Murder committed by a person who had previously been
convicted of murder in the first or second degree;"'
(3) Murder committed in'the perpetration of or attempt to per-
petrate a rape, arson, robbery, or burglary wfiere the defendant had
previously been convicted of rape, arson, robbery, or burglaryP7
All of the criteria enumerated above are specific in nature. Each one
(except for killing by "common -design") would be provable either as
a matter of record (e.g., prior conviction) or as one of the essential ele-
ments of the crime (e.g., "murder of a police officer"). Notwithstanding
this fact, Nevada, Indiana, Tennessee, and Oklahoma have specifically
enacted or retained provisions either allowing or requiring the jury to
specify one of the degrees of murder in its 'verdict: "The jury before
whom any person indicted for murder is tried shall, if they find such per-
son guilty thereof, designate by their verdict whether such person is guilty
of capital murder, or murder of the first or second degree." 8  It has
been noted above that the differentiation of murder into degrees has been
a prime source of discretion in the capital punishment process. This kind
of provision allowing the jury to designate the degree can abrogate the
carefully delineated categories set out in the statute and lead to decisions
by whim or caprice. Furthermore, if the use of such statutes is an attempt
08 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-54 (b) (viii) (1973).
04 See, e.g., NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.030-1 (a) (2)(e) (1973).
95See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 701.1 (7) (1973).
96See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-54 (b)(iv) (1973); IND. CODE § 35-13.4-1(5).
07 See IND. CODE § 35-13-4-1 (7) (1973); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6.54 (b) (vi) (1973).
Mss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (1972), as amended, (1974) provides a mandatory death pen.
alty for rape of a female child under the age of 12 years.
OBSee, e.g., NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.030-4 (1973). OLA. STAT. ANN. § 703 (1973)
allows greater leeway:
In a jury trial for murder in the first degree, nothing in this section shall preclude
the trial judge from instructing the jury regarding lesser and included offenses and
lesser degrees of homicide if the evidence warrants such instructions .... The judge
shall state into the record his reasons for giving the instruction based upon the evl.
dence adduced at trial.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2404 (1955) has been retained, requiring the jury to specify the de.
gree of murder in its verdict.
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avoid the problem of jury nullification,"0 the remedy does not solve the
roblem. In reality, the legislature is simply substituting one form of
iscretion (choice of degrees) for the other (nullification by refusal to
:nvict).
Only one statute makes any provision for prosecutorial control: Indi-
na prevents the prosecutor from including lesser offenses in the same
idictment for first degree murder. 00 This leaves untouched the prose-
utor's power to charge only the lesser offenses even when there is clear
vidence that a first degree indictment is in order. The statutes of Ten-
essee and New Mexico aggravate the problem of prosecutorial discre-
[on by simply indicating that any kind of murder not constituting a first
egree offense is a second degree offense.' 0 ' In addition, these statutes
ontain felony murder provisions and premeditation clauses which are
ipposedly sufficient, without any narrowing provisions (such as those
adicated above), to require a charge of and conviction for first degree
aurder. It has been shown, however, that the difficulty'of identifying
7hat premeditation is and when it exists allows the jury to convict on
s own whim, while permitting the prosecutor to charge on the basis
f plea bargaining or other factors.10 2
Wyoming,' 3 Nevada, 104 and Oklahoma have enacted provisions
or automatic appeal after a sentence of death. Oklahoma has provided
riteria for the appellate courts to use in examining the sentence:
Upon the hearing the Court shall determine whether the sentence of
death was a result of discrimination based on race, creed, economic con-
dition, social position, class or sex of the defendant or any other arbi-
trary fact; and the Court shall specifically determine whether the sen-
tence of death is substantially disproportionate to the penalty imposedin
similar cases, considering both the crimes and the defendant. 105
The very existence of this section belies the mandatory nature of the
tatute. The extraneous factors enumerated would presumably have
99 See Note, Capital Sentencing-Effect of McGaatha and Furman, 45 TiiP. LQ. 619,
27 (1972).
10 0 IND. CODE § 35-13-4-1.
10 1 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2403 (1955): "All other kinds of murder shall be deemed
aurder in the second degree;" NEW MEx. STAT. ANNx. 40A-2-1(B) (1963): "Murder in
ie second degree consists of all other murder."
102LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.30 and § 14.30.1 (1951), as amended (Supp. 1974)
ttemp:s to differentiate between first and second degree murders by requiring a specific
atent "to kill or to inflict great bodily harm" in the first degree provision. This is of
ittle aid, for the judgments concerning specific intent will be highly personal ones for the
rosecutor as well as the jury.
10 3 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-54 (d) (1973).
104 NE . REV. STAT. § 177.055 (1967).
105 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 705 (Supp. 1973).
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been eliminated by the mandatory classification. Such a provision,
therefore, is tacit recognition that a purely mandatory stattite operating
without discretion or abuse is impossible. As to the examination for dis-
proportion, it is unclear how the court is to make such a determination,
It is only assured of hearing those cases in which the death sentence has
been imposed. In practice,. the court may not (depending on the inci-
dence of plea bargaining) have a perspective on review broad enough to
perceive disproportion.
Two state legislatures, Delaware and North Carolina, have remained
passive while their supreme courts adopted the simple expedient of sev-
ering discretionary jury sentencing provisions to make a mandatory stat-
ute.106 Recently, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld this nianda.
tory punishment against a variety of attacks,"" including attacks based
on the impermissible existence of discretion in the executive clemency
prerogative, the authority of the prosecutor, and the responsibility of the
jury in choosing the 'egree of the crime. In each realm, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court refused to accept the argument that each discretionary
function may allow freakish or arbitrary imposition of the punishment.
In particular, the court assumed that no solicitor would select the charge
on any basis other than a legal evaluation of the evidence. Moreover,
the court flatly stated that no majority justice in Furman eier suggested
that the governor's power was a discretionary act making the death pen-
alty unconstitutional. 08 In summary the court stated: "If the existence of
these discretionary powers makes the imposition of the death penalty un-
constitutional, it would also make unconstitutional all prison terms, how-
ever long or short."' 0 9
Contrary to that court's assertions, it has been shown that the death
penalty is different in kind from any other punishment because of its
magnitude, and that distinct criteria apply in determining its constitu-
tionality. The capricious results of the system are not due to any one dis-
cretionary element, but to all of them combined. Likewise, the majority
justices did not limit their concern to any one such element, but instead
based their conclusions on the freakish application of the penalty result-
100 State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E.2d 19 (1973); State v. Dlckerson, 298
A.2d 761 (Del. Supr. 1973). Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 15 Crim. L. Rptr. 2183 (Apr.
22, 1974), upheld Virginia's statute dealing with capital punishment for the killing of prison
guards. The court confined the Furman rationale to sentencing discretion exercised by a jury
or a judge.
107 State v. Jarrette,. 14 Crim. L. Rptr. 2469 (N. Car. Feb. 25, 1974).
108 But see text accompanying footnotes 66-70, supra.
109 14 Crim. L Rptr. at 2470.
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ing from the entire operation of the capital punishment process. 10 Thus,
although these statutes have eliminated discretion in the actual sentenc-
ing process, the areas of prosecutorial discretion (including plea bargain-
ing), executive clemency (for which change would require a state consti-
tutional amendment) and competence of counsel are left virtually un-
touched. In addition, the jury is often given the prerogative of convicting
for first or second degree murder in its verdict. The total effect of the
statutes is to allow much of the discretion of the pre-Furman system to
remain in the present system. This discretion can readily prevent an
even-handed application of the death penalty.
B. Statutes Narrowing the Range of Crimes or Limiting Discretion
This category is formed by those statutes which do not permit the
death penalty to be imposed unless the crime involves at least one of a
number of specifitally 'prescribed "aggravating circumstances." These
aggravating circumstances, which normally are fewer than ten in number,
usually consist of specific attributes of a crime. Hence the statutes limit
discretion by narrowing the range of crimes for which the death penalty
may be imposed.111
All of these statutes (passed by Texas, Georgia, and California)'"
provide for separate sentencing proceedings in which evidence is presented
by both the defendant and the prosecutor on the issue of aggravating
circumstances. If the prosecutor does not charge one of the special cir-
cumstances, there is no possibility of receiving the death penalty. All of
these statutes require that the findings must be beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although this rule on its face seems absolute, there remains the problem
of whether the judge or the jury will find that an aggravating circum-
stance exists. In other words, if the fact-finder does not wish to sentence
10 See Junker, The Death Penalty Cases: A Preliminary Comment, 48 WASH. I. REV.
95, 108 (1972).
1 11 See Note, Scope of Appellate Review of Sentences in Capital Cates, 108 U. PA. L REV.
434, 445 (1960), n.80:
A distinction must be drawn between categorical prerequisites-whereby the leg.
islature directs that a defendant shall not be sentenced to punishment X unless the
court finds that factor A is present-and considerations-whereby the legislature
directs the court to consider factor B in imposing sentence. The former limit dis-
cretion; the latter guide its exercise.
112 In People v. Purcell, 15 Crim. L Rptr. 2001 (Mar. 6, 1974), a California superior
court upheld California's new statute enacted pursuant to article I, section 27, which was ap-
proved by the California voters last year. People v. Sims, 15 Crim. L. Rptr. 2239 (May 8,
1974), also upheld the statute in the face of an argument similar to that suggested here. The
court stated that there was a presumption that the prosecutor would exercise his powers in a
proper manner. In addition, the court did not expect that a jury would disregard its duty and
the courts instructions in reaching a verdict not warranted by the facts and the law.
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the defendant to death, he can simply refuse to hold that any of the ag-
gravating circumstances were present.
One commentator has concluded that any legislative effort to restrict
the control of the sentencing party is "foredoomed to failure,""' Wheth-
er this statement is true or not, discretion-or potential for abuse in arbi-
trary sentencing-has not been effectively eliminated by these statutes,
though it may have been somewhat curtailed.
Before any attempt is made to analyze some of the typical provisions
of these statutory schemes, it should be noted that their general focus
is negative, in that they are concerned almost exclusively with aggravat-
ing, rather than mitigating, circumstances.114 For instance, one such clas-
sification of circumstances focuses on the harm caused by the offense, and
includes murder by hire and murder of a police officer, a witness to a
crime, or a judicial officer."- The Georgia statute has two provisions
which focus on the risk of harm created by the defendant in committing
the offense charged:
1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of another
capital felony, or aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was com.
mitted, while the offender was engaged in the commission of burglary or
arson in the first degree."n
2) The offender by his act of murder, aimed robbery, or kidnap-
ping knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person
in a public place by means of a weapon or device which would normal-
ly be hazardous to the lives of more than one person." 7
113 George, Aggravating Circumstances in American Substantive and Procedural Criminal
Law, 32 U. Mo. K.C. L. REV. 14, 27 (1964).
1 An exception is CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West Supp, 1974) :
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the death penalty shall not be
imposed upon any person who was under the age of 18 years at the time of the
commission of the crime.
(b) [Except for murder for hire] ... the death penalty shall not be imposed upon
any person who is a principal in the commission of a capital offense unless he was
personally present during the commission of the act or acts causing death, and di-
rectly committed or physically aided in the commission of such act or acts.
California has specifically retained a mandatory death sentence for three crimes: kidnapping
where death of the victim occurs (CAL. PENAL CODE § 209 (West, Supp. 1974)); train
wrecking where death of a victim occurs (CAL. PENAL CODE § 219 (West, Supp, 1974));
assault by a life prisoner on.a corrections official where death results within one year (CAL,
PENAL CODE § 4500 (West. Supp. 1974)).
115 GA. CODE ANN. § 27.2534.1 (1972), as amended, Ga. Laws No. 74 (1973) (herein.
after indicated by the date 1973) has some additional provisions relating to murder during an
escape or during the prevention of a lawful arrest. Georg~ia also allows total discretionary
sentencing for the offenses of treason and aircraft hijacking in that the restrictions for other
capital crimes are not applicable to these crimes.
110 GA. CODE ANN. § 27.2534.1 (b)(2) (1973).
117 GA. CODE ANN. § 21.2534.1 (b)(3) (1973).
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The latter -provision allows discretion in the sentencing determination
through its vague wording (e.g., what constitutes "knowingly creat[ing]
a great risk of death"). California has a catch-all provision for a willful,
deliberate and premeditated murder in the commission of any one of five
felonies."" This is, in fact, so broad that it is questionable whether Cali-
fornia has actually narrowed the range of crimes at all. Beyond this, the
jury's difficulty in determining the existence of premeditation indicates
that this aggravating circumstance could easily permit capricious results.
Both Georgia and California have provisions designed to include those
deferndants who are a risk to society. California chose the standard of
more than one conviction of murder" 9 (a readily applicable criterion)
while Georgia opted for a more malleable standard: "The offense of mur-
der, rape, armed robbery or kidnapping was committed by a person with
a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense of murder
was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaul-
tive criminal convictions.' 1.2 0
It is probable that the last phrase of the statute can be manipulated
by the prosecutor, judge, or jury in accordance with their belief whether
or not capital punishment is appropriate for a particular defendant. The
standard does provide some guidance in that it requires an examination
of the defendant's criminal history. However, it leaves open for inter-
pretation the question of how to evaluate the defendant's individual his-
tory in a manner consistent with the~statutory intent. 2-1
Finally, only Georgia has a criterion which represents a judgment
based on the moral state of the defendant: "The offense of murder,
rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or
an aggravated battery to the victim."' -2  This standard is evidently in-
tended to include those defendants who do not fit into another category
and who might be unfit to live from the viewpoint of the jury. In prac-
tice, this provision might be apropos in a great number of cases, but its
-118 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(b)(3) (Supp. 1974).
119 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(b)(4) (Supp. 1974).
120 GA. CODE ANN. § 27.2534.1 (b)(1) (1973).
12 1 At this juncture, a brief examination of TEL. CODE CBIM. PROc. ANN. art. 37.071
(Supp. 1974) will show that while attempting to follow a format similar to California and
Georgia, Texas made some significant changes. Texas requires that each of its three aggravat-
ing circumstances be found true in order to impose the death penalty. To some extent,
therefore, it evinces a policy in favor of life imprisonment since the very number of threshold
questions theoretically would make it more difficult to impose the death sentence. Neverthe-
less, Texas has phrased the criteria in terms of reasonableness and probability-words that
allow, the full range of jury's reactions to influence its determination.
122 GA. CODE ANN. § 27.2534.1 (b)(7) (1973).
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vague and pliable terminology allows the jury substantial freedom in
applying it to defendants.
All of these statutes provide for jury determination of the penalty.
The Georgia statute mandates that if the jury cannot make a unanimous
decision, it shall be discharged and a sentence of life imprisonment is to
be imposed by the judge. California requires that only after a second
jury cannot choose the penalty unanimously is the judge to impose a life
sentence.' Texas, California, and Georgia all require an automatic re-
view by an appellate court, presumably to examine the punishment as
well as the conviction. Georgia has detailed three criteria for use by its
supreme court in reviewing the sentence:
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influ-
ence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and(2) Whether, in cases other than treason or aircraft hijacking, the
evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating
circumstance as enumerated in Code section 27-2534.1(b); and
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate
to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and
the defendant. 12 5
With regard to this last provision, the statute requires that the supreme
coulrt make an adequate comparison with similar cases and include such
references in its decision. But whether the supreme court is actually ca-
pable of adequately comparing similar cases (including those that were
opted out of the process through plea bargaining) is highly question-
able. 20  Moreover, an efficacious perusal of the evidence is dependent
on the court's attitude toward juries: it may either be disposed toward
affirming most convictions and sentences, or it may decide to interfere
frequently on the basis of its own whim. Finally, the first criterion, that
of avoiding passion or prejudice, was evidently inserted to counteract the
sentencing standard dealing with the defendant's "depravity of mind."
The inclusion of such a criterion as a check on the jury indicates the prob-
lematical aspects of a discretionary standard. Whether the criteria estab-
lished for the supreme court effectively curtail the jury's discretion is de-
batable. It is more likely that the review procedure simply injects another
discretionary stage into the system.' 2'
Thus these statutes which narrow the range of crimes for which the
125 GA. CODE ANN. § 26.3102 (1973).
124 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (Supp. 1974).
3
2 5 GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(c) (1973).
120 See GLUEcK, Predictive Devices and the lndividualization of Iutkce, 23 LAW &
CONT. PROB. 461, 466 (1958), where the author indicates that appellate review could Impose
only a "superficial uniformity" at best.
127 Cf. Note, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CALIM. L RIm. 1268, 1434-41 (1968).
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death penalty can be imposed leave wide gaps in the sentencing process.
There are no provisions dealing with prosecutorial descretion. Consid-
ering the few broad categories enumerated by the statutes, the prosecutor's
power is virtually unlimited. In addition, executive clemency, as a con-
stitutional prerogative, has hot been dealt with at all. Similarly, the prob-
lems involved with the competency of counsel have remained, since the
legislatures seem powerless to relieve them. Finally, it seems clear that,
even under a procedure which requires it to focus on a specific catalogue
of aggravating circumstances, the jury itself may continue to exercise a
great deal of discretionary power.
C. Limiting the Exercise of Discretion
The eight statutes limiting the exercise of discretion direct the deliber-
ations within the sentencing process while allowing the fact-finder to
measure the significance of each factor in relation to the individual de-
fendant. 18 This combination of goals indicates an attempt on the part
of the legislature to obtain a maximum individualization of punishment.
Thus, although the legislatures can claim that some regularity has been
imposed on the sentencing procedure, the juxtaposition of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances allows the jury and the judge substantial
discretion in their responsibility for determining the applicability of any
of these circumstances. Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Montana,129 Nebraska,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Utah have passed 'statutes embodying the main
characteristics of this category.130 ,
It appears that the factors set out in the statutes are specifically
worded when the legislature intended to restrict discretion and ambigu-
ously formulated when the legislature did not want to curtail to any great
extent the power exercised by the fact-finder. Thus the aggravating cir-
cumstances tend to be more specific than the mitigating ones. The most
common aggravating cirumstances subsumed by the category of harm
caused by the offense are:
(1) The murder was committed for. hire, or for pecuniary gain,
12 8 See George, Aggravating Circumstances in American Substantive and Procedural Criv.-
inal Law, 32 U. MO. K.C. L REV. 14, 30 (1964).
M9 It is "doubtful whether Montana intended to comply with the settled law (i.e. jury/
judge sentencing discretion) arising from Furman, not to mention the policy behind that
legislature's decision. -MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-5-105 (1973) lists six circumstances
for which the death penalty is to be imposed "unless there are mitigating circumstances."
The Comment exalts the latter phrase as a "humanistic escape valve"--an idea which is
hardly in line with the Supreme Court's judgment that the historical device for injecting
mercy into the system had run its course as a constitutional technique.
130 Many of these statutes ate 'derived from MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6 (Tent. Draft
No. 10, 1959).
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or the defendant hired another to commit the murder for the defen-
dant.13'
(2) The victim was a law enforcement officer or a public servant
having custody of the offender or another.3 2
(3) The offense was committed while the offender was commit-
ting, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing
or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggra-
vated robbery or aggravated burglary.1 33
(4) The death of thevictim occurred while defendant was en-
gaged in the hijacking of an aircraft.1 84
Within the category of the risk caused by the defendant in the par-
ticular crime, the following aggravating circumstances are apt illustra-
tions of the difference between specific and general phraseology:
(1) At the time the murder was committed, the offender also
committed another murder.185
(2) In the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly
created a grave risk of death to another person or persons in addition
to the victim of the offense.13
A number of fact patterns could arguably fit within the latter category.
The words "knowingly" (necessitating proof of intent) and "grave risk"
(calling for a personal estimation) do little to separate those who should
or consistently will be within this category from those who should not
or will not be so classified. Although the latter category covers a broader
spectrum (a legitimate legislative determination perhaps) than the stan-
dard of commission of more than one murder, it only does so by de-
pending on the fact-finder's discretion.
These statutes also contain standards which indicate a concern with
the risk the defendant poses towards society, making it an aggravating
13 1 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-417-8 (1) (c), as amended, Leg. Bill 268 (1973) [herein.
after 1973].
132 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-417-8 (1)(g) (1973).
133 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (A) (7) (Page S.pecial Supp. 1973). This provi-
sion functions as a broad category which would include a large percentage of all offenders,
'34 PA. STAT. ANN. tir. 18, § 1311(d) (1) (iv) (1974).
13 5 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-417-8 (1)(e) (1973).
laOAmz. REv. STAT. ANx. § 13-454 (1)(3) (Supp. 1973). Utah has a very similar
provision in its first degree murder statute which should be contrasted with its second degree
murder criteria in UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (1953), as amended (Supp. 1973): "In-
tending to cause serious bodily injury to another, he commits an act clearly dangerous to
human life that causes the death of another . . ." While it is true that Utah has a general
murder clause for first degree offenses (as do most of the states) with language about Inten.
tion or premeditation prior to the listing of the aggravating circumstances, that language
is insufficient to distinguish between these two criteria in practice. In fact, Utah has blended
these portions of its first and second degree murder statute so carefully that one wonders
whether the legislature was purposefully retaining prosecutorial discretion.
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circumstance for the offender to have: (1) previously been convicted of
first or second degree murder;137 (2) a substantial history of serious as-
saultive or terrorizing criminal activity. 138 Again, the specificity of the
first example effectively guides a judge's or jury's determination. The
second merely indicates an area of general concern and provides no con-
trol over the personal reactions or criteria brought to bear by the trier of
fact.
Finally, despite the broad reach of these other categories, Arizona,
Florida, and Nebraska found it necessary to add sections relating to the
moral state. of the defendant: (1) "The capital felony was especially hei-
nous, atrocious or cruel";139 (2) "The murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, cruel or manifested exceptional depravity by ordinary standards
of morality and intelligence. ' ' 140 Although the inclusion of the last phrase,
"by ordinary standards," may limit the exercise of discretion, the concepts
of heinousness and cruelty will undoubtedly vary a great deal among jury-
men. This too is a catch-all category for those who do not fit elsewhere
in the scheme.
The mitigating circumstances are cast in language at the opposite end
of the spectrum from the aggravating ones.' 4 ' As to the harm caused by
the offense, the only applicable standard is one of minor participation in
a felony murder..42  The primary standard relating to the risk of harm
caused by the offense is: "He could not reasonably have foreseen that
his conduct in the course of the commission of the offense for which he
was convicted would cause, or would create a grave risk of causing, death
to another person."' 43
The category which focuses on the risk to society posed by the defen-
dant is more comprehensive and includes some of the following stan-
dards: (1) "The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or
consented to the act";e ' (2) "The offender acted under unusual pressures
13 7 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202 (1953), as amended (Supp. 1973)
'
38 NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-417-8 (1)(a) (1973).
13 9 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (6) (h) (1972),as amended, (Supp. 1973) Another in-
dication of Florida s attitude toward the death penalty is that it allows that sentence to be
imposed on rapists of children under the age of 11 (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.01), which is
in contrast to its avowed purpose of "taking a life only when a life is taken." (Comment,
§ 805.02).
14 0 NEB. F . STAT. § 28-41-8 (1)(d) (1973).
'M' ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 5-8-IA (Smith Hurd 1974) provides that the decision
be made by a three-judge panel who should determine that there are compelling reasons
for mercy. The panel is evidently free to consider whatever factors it alone deems appro-
priate.
142 See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-417-8 (2)(e) (1973).
143 ARIZ. RET. STAT. ANN. § 13-454(F) (4) (Supp. 1973).
144 NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-417-8 (2) (f) (1973). (The criterion of victim participation
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or influences or under the domination of another person"; 145 (3) "The
offender has no significant history of prior criminal activity ,,140 The in-
clusion of criteria which require the jury to distinguish between signficant
criminal history (mitigating circumstance) and fubstantal criminal history
(aggravating circumstance) indicates a serious erosion of the attempt to
curtail discretion. Between these two standards, there is a substantial
gray area where the facts may be juggled and arbitrarily applied by the
fact-finder.
Finally, the mitigating circumstances concerning the defendant's mor-
al condition are very broad: (1) "The capacity of the defendant to appre-
,ciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law was substantially impaired"; *T (2) "[T]he youth of
the defendant at the time of the crime";148 (3) "The murder was coin-
mitted while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance.' '141 These criteria are an obvious escape mechan-
ism for a jury which does not wish, for whatever reason, to sentence a
defendant to death. Moreover, there is no effective way of requiring the
jury to actually consider and apply these criteria.
In addition, these standards allow the introduction of evidence which
could prove either an aggravating circumstance (e.g., depravity of mind)
or a mitigating circumstance (e.g., emotional disturbance) 150 Since rea-
sonable men could be persuaded by either one of these alternatives, the
ultimate sentence will depend on the luck of the draw A sentencing
system dependent on such a variable is very likely to culminate in arbi-
trary and freakish determinations.51
The imposition of the sentence under this type of statute, always oc-
curs upon the conclusion of a separate sentencing proceeding in which
evidence is presented on the circumstances enumerated. The guide-
lines for weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, how-
seems to indicate that a co-felon s life is not worth as much (or should not be so protected)
as that of a bank teller).
145 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-418 (2)(b) (1973).
146 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-417 (2)(a) (1973).
147 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (7)(f) (Supp. 1973).
1 4 8 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (1) (a) (e) (Supp. 1973).
140 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207-1 (b) (Supp. 1973).
io See also Note, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CALiF. L. REV. 1268, 1434 (1968).
151 One discretionary facet that all the statutes (with the exception of Utah) have avoided
is an open-ended listing of either aggfavating or mitigating circumstances. Most of the
states specifically state that the aggravating'(or mitigating) circumstances "shall be the follow-
ing." This specification not only focuses the jury s or judge's deliberations but also provides
a definite background for appellate court review. See generally Note, Capital Sentencing
-Effects of McGauth and Furman,, 45 TEMP. L. Q. 619, 631 (1972); The Altermath of
Furman: The Florida Experience, 64 J. CiuM. L & C 2 (1973); Note, The Two Trial Systam
i Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 51, 73 (1964)
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ever, are less than clear-cut. The usual consideration is whether "there
a.re insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating cir-
cumstances,' ' 52 or language to the effect. Whether the mitigating cir-
cumstances outweigh the aggravating ones is entirely dependent on the
individual conceptions of the jurors and judges. Though appellate courts
may attempt to institute some consistency in this area, an even-handed ap-
plication may still not occur since it is doubtful that those receiving life
sentences would appeal that portion of the decision.
Nebraska has put forth a more lenient standard in that it is sufficient
if the mitigating circumstances "approach or exceed the weight given to
the aggravating circumstances."l" Nevertheless, similar discretionary
possibilities are inherent in this proviso. Ohio and Pennsylvania have
the dearest formulation in that they mandate that even one mitigating
circumstance found as a fact precludes the imposition of the death pen-
alty.154
Arizona, Illinois, Nebraska, and Ohio provide that the sentence be
imposed by the judge.155 Florida has opted for a jury advisory opinion
with a judicial decision,' 16 while Pennsylvania and Utah " T allow the jury
to choose the sentence. In most states, the normal rules of evidence are
suspended, so that almost any evidence will be permitted as long as the
defendant has an opportunity to rebut it.'5 8  On the other hand, only the
Arizona, Illinois, and Pennsylvania statutes indicate where the burden
of proof lies,'59 and only Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania indicate what
that burden is.' 60 The additional factors introduced by the type of evi-
dence and the burden of proof and persuasion are beyond the scope of
'152 LA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 C3) (Supp. 1974). The drafters of the Model Pendl
Code indicated a definite preference for the balancing process that is entailed by this language.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1959).
153 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-417 (1973).
154 OHO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (B); (Page Special Supp. 1973), PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 1311(c) (Supp. 1974).
1 55 Auz REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-454 (A) (Supp. 1973); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-417-
7 (1973); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (C) (Page Special Supp. 1973).
2 5 6 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (2) (Supp. 1974).
157p& STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1311 (c) (1974). UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (Supp.
1973).
158 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (1) (Supp. 1974).
15 9 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-454 (B) (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 1311 (c) (Supp. 1974). The prosecutor has the burden for the aggravating circumstances
and the defendant for the mitigating circumstances; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 5-8-1A (Supp.
1974), where the state has the burden for the aggravating circumstances.
160 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (E) (Page Special Supp. 1973); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 1311(c) (Supp. 1974), where the mitigating circumstances must be proved
by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 5-8-
1A (Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1311 (c) (Supp. 1974), hold that the
state has the burden of proving the aggraving circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
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thi's paper. It is sufficient to note that these considerations can make a
great deal of difference in the outcome of the sentencing process."' Fi-
nally, most of the states provide for automatic appeal for review of the
sentence and conviction-a minimal safeguard for controlling judge and
jury abuse of the sentencing authority.
This section of the note has concentrated almost exclusively on
statutes dealing .with the sentencing process, and on the discretionary
elements of the process which these statutes have either created or failed
to eliminate.10 3  It should be noted, however, that irregular applica-
tion of the death penalty resulting from the discretion of the prosecutor,
varying competence of the counsel, and executive clemency also remain
within the system.
V. CONCLUSION
The statutes passed so far by the legislatures may comply with the
letter of the law in Furman-but certainly not the spirit. No statute ef-
fectively abrogates the discretion of the sentencing authorities and few
even attempt to abate other discretionary aspects of the criminal justice
system. Although some thought has- evidently gone into the determi-
nation of what crimes should carry the death penalty (e.g., most statutes
have eliminated the so-called "passion murder" from the repertoire), the
inclusion of broad and wide-ranging clauses shows that little intensive
study of the capital punishment system was undertaken prior to this kind
of legislation.
.Although this note has stressed the inability of either the judge or
the jury to be an unbiased and consistent sentencing agent, there have
been no aspersions cast upon the capabilities of the jury and the judge
as fact-finders in other phases of the criminal system. The legal and mor-
al issues coupled with the emotional reactions of the sentencing officials
(whether they feel pity or disgust) involved in the selection of the death
penalty make a uniform application of that punishment well nigh im-
possible. Because of the drastic nature and magnitude of the death pen-
alty, the potential and actual inability of the triers of fact and the other
-
101 See generally, The Aftermath of Furman: The Florida Experience, 64 J. CalM. L & C.
2 (1973); Note, The Two Trial System in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. RBV. 50 (1964);
Note, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1268, 1404 (1968); Knowlton, Probleml
of Jury Discretion in Capital-Cases, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1099 (1953).
102 See, Hall, Reduction of Criminal Sentences on Appeal, c7 COLUM, L. Rgv. 521, 762,
(1973), where the author demonstrates that appellate review has not reduced the disparity
of sentences among convicted criminals.
16a Goldberg, supra note 8, at 1794. See also, M. MELTSNBR, CRUBL AND UNUSUAL
301 (1937), for his opinion that the Court will not accept such statutes as an "experiment
at the price of human life."
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authorities within the criminal justice system to ensure a non-arbitrary
application of that .pumshment demands that all capital punishment be
declared unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual punishments dause.
Kathryn Haller
